USERNAME 
PASSWORD 
Subscriber? · Lost password?
Lost username? · More help
Archive > 2007 > Jan · Feb · Mar · Apr · May · Jun · Jul · Aug · Sep · Oct · Nov · Dec
January 18, 2007 · Washington Babylon · Previous · Next  

Two Takes on Iraq

By Ken Silverstein

After reading the U.N.'s statement that at least 34,452 civilians died violent deaths last year in Iraq, I touched base with two expert sources and asked if they thought President Bush's decision to send an additional 21,500 troops to Iraq could restore order to the country.

Take One: Fix Baghdad and kill Sadr

My first source is a former CIA officer who was stationed in Iraq during the post-invasion period and who is extremely pessimistic about the situation there. He believes the situation could be greatly improved if Lt. Gen. David Petraeus—whom President Bush recently picked to take command of all Coalition forces in Iraq—moves with “speed, alacrity, and ruthlessness.”

The former CIA officer described Petraeus as “a gifted, charismatic combat leader” who has lofty career aspirations. “He's a political general,” the source said. “We'll see him run for office one day. His future depends on successfully executing this plan, and he's not going to be able to blame the Iraqis if it goes wrong. So he'll act with vigor and there'll be no more micromanagement from Washington now that [Donald] Rumsfeld is gone as Secretary of Defense. Petraeus will have the latitude he needs.”

The first thing that needs to happen in Iraq is the restoration of order to Baghdad. “The capital has got to be locked down,” he said, “so there's a perception of stability and people can come out of their houses and not be blown up. Right now there's no sense of security. People in Iraq are accustomed to seeing a government presence on the street, and right now it's not there.” With the troop increase, the source said, Petraeus “will have enough guys” to have a major impact on Baghdad.

The second thing that needs to happen, he asserted, is the death of Moqtada al-Sadr, the Shiite cleric who heads the formidable Mahdi Army, because there is no chance of stabilizing Iraq as long as he is alive. As an eldest son, Sadr inherited his title and authority from his father. The cleric has no children and hence, in the event of his death, power would devolve to an uncle. “I know [the uncle] and have worked with him,” the former officer said. “He's completely different from Sadr; he's focused on the economic side, on reconstruction, and on improving the lives of the average Shiite. If Shiites were working, religion would be a secondary issue instead of the only thing they've got.”

U.S. forces, said my source, twice had the opportunity to kill Sadr, first in 2003 after his supporters killed Abdul Majid al-Khoei, a British-based Shiite Muslim leader who had returned to Iraq to work with Coalition forces, and again in 2004. “His mother dimed him out that time. He was in Najaf, and we couldn't pin down his location. She went to a member of the family who told us where he was. You know the guy is bad news when his own mother wants him dead.”

Both times, my source explained, Paul Bremer—who was then the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority—blocked the possibility of targeting Sadr, over the heated objections of CIA officers. “We should have killed him a long time ago,” said my source. “There was going to be blowback, but he was a problem that wasn't going to get any better. And now we're at the point where we are today.”

The former CIA officer said that Sadr “is at risk from within the Shiite community, from the Iraqi government itself, and from us,” and that his death would weaken the influence of Iran and “eliminate the biggest problem” faced by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. “With Sadr gone,” he said, “the Shiite alliance could realign itself and Maliki would face less pressure from the Sadr faction and from Iran. Maliki isn't perfect, but he doesn't want to see Iraq fall apart. He knows that U.S. patience is gone and that there's an accelerated timetable. He only has hard choices, but he knows he has to make them.”

How long will it take to know if a troop increase and Petraeus's appointment will make a difference? “Sixty to ninety days,” said my source. “We're going to find out fast if there's any chance of success.”


Note: at 8:50 this morning (January 18, 2007) a source close to Lt. Gen. Petraeus called me to tell me that Petraeus has no political aspirations.

w

Take two: Partition, then give up

The second person with whom I spoke was Bob Baer, a former CIA officer who was stationed mostly in the Middle East from 1976 to 1997. He was decidedly more negative about the prospects in Iraq than my first source.

Baer also thinks that the deployment of the additional troops is a good idea—but only if they are used to facilitate the orderly partition of Iraq, which, he said, is now inevitable. According to Baer, “The number of Iraqis who still believe Humpty Dumpty can be put back together couldn't fill a conference room at the American Enterprise Institute.”

Baer said there's no way to confront the Sunni insurgency and the Shiite militias without “a surge of 500,000 troops.” In his estimation, it's also too late to prevent Iran from consolidating its position in Iraq. He pointed out that Iranian currency is already widely circulated in the southern city of Basra and that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are deeply embedded in the country. “Iraq is turning to Iran, and there's nothing we can do about that short of invading Iran or fully occupying Iraq, shutting its borders, and launching the equivalent of the Marshall Plan.”

Baer sees Maliki, who heads an Iranian-backed party, as part of the problem. The Shiite forces, he said, are on the cusp of achieving a historic victory in Iraq and not about to turn back. “Are they going to decide to cut back their ambitions and work with the Sunnis because they always treated the Shiites so well?” he asked. “I don't think so. They want Baghdad and they're going to get it.”

Asked if Sadr's early demise would change anything, Baer's outlook was still grim. “It wouldn't matter. People said the same thing before, about capturing Saddam or killing Zarqawi. The problems in Iraq are too diffuse. The country is deeply anti-American. We've lost their hearts and minds and we're not going to win them back. When has an Apache helicopter won the hearts and minds of anyone?”


[More Washington Babylon]

[Contact Ken Silverstein]

[About Washington Babylon]

Previous · Next · More Washington Babylon · Respond via email
As little as $16.97 for 12 months of Harper's—
plus access to our 158-year archive.

JULY 2009

BARACK HOOVER OBAMA
The Best and the Brightest Blow It Again
By Kevin Baker

LABOR’S LAST STAND
The Corporate Campaign to Kill the Employee Free Choice Act
By Ken Silverstein

WAIT TILL YOU SEE ME DANCE
A story by Deb Olin Unferth

Also: Mark Slouka and Paul West

Subscribe to the Weekly Review:


We will not sell your email address.