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ProPublica talks with Charles S. Faddis, a former top operative for the CIA and author of a new book about “likely terror targets in the U.S.: dams, rail lines, military bases, biological research labs and nuclear, chemical and liquid natural gas plants.”
His findings are a catalog of danger and negligence. He says he encountered systemically weak, outmoded defenses and poorly trained personnel more apt at discouraging burglars than stopping suicide terror teams…
At a suburban office park in Maryland, he discovered that a biological laboratory full of deadly viruses didn’t have guards, gates, fences or security cameras likes those he found at a nearby bank. His book reviews a litany of security flaws in the bioweapons research world revealed by the 2001 anthrax attacks, which were allegedly the work of a disgruntled scientist, and criticizes the dramatic increase in the number of labs handling lethal substances.
More from Ken Silverstein:
Commentary — July 25, 2012, 2:20 pm
Washington Babylon — September 29, 2010, 11:37 am


Years of consideration preceding the inclusion of the word “phat” in Random House’s 1996 Compact Unabridged Dictionary:

Scientists created crash helmets that stink when cracked and fruit flies to whom blue light smells delicious.

In Belize, a construction company bulldozed a 2,300-year-old Mayan temple to make road fill.
“This is the heart of the magic factory, the place where medicine is infused with the miracles of science, and I’ve come to see how it’s done.”